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INTRODUCTION
Jose, an immigrant entrepreneur, came to America
seeking the American dream.1 Like many before him, Jose
understood that this dream could be realized only through
earning a quality education. However, like most immigrants,
Jose could not afford to pay for his schooling, so he sought
entrepreneurial methods to pay his tuition. He devised a plan
to purchase, in a foreign country, books published in America
at rates lower than the retail price found in America, and
then sell these books in America at a discounted price. Once
1. Jose is a fictional character used to highlight the main point which this article
addresses.
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the publishers found out about Jose’s business, they sought
injunctive relief in order to stop his book sales immediately.
This article addresses whether a plaintiff, seeking an
injunction, must actually prove that the defendant’s actions
caused the plaintiff irreparable harm or whether irreparable
harm is presumed from a finding of copyright infringement.
Injunctive relief is a drastic measure. In his article,
Andrew F. Spillane argues that an injunction should always
flow from copyright infringement, as irreparable harm should
be presumed.2 However, Spillane’s argument fails to correctly
analyze a Supreme Court decision indicating that irreparable
harm must be demonstrated.
Further, he fails to
appropriately address the fact that requiring the plaintiff to
demonstrate irreparable harm would lead to a more equitable
result.
A copyright is a set of exclusive rights granted by the
federal government to the creator of an original work for a
limited period of time.3 This includes the right to copy,
distribute, perform, display, and adapt the work.4 The
Constitution protects both patents and copyrights in order “to
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”5 Thus,
the Founding Fathers appreciated the important role played
by patents and copyrights in promoting economic incentives
for innovation and creativity.6
Injunctive relief is a powerful tool within the arsenal of the
courts.
It can protect victims of intellectual property
infringement by ordering defendants to cease their infringing
activities.7 Prior to the seminal Supreme Court decision on
injunctive relief, eBay v. MercExchange,8 a plaintiff needed to
show only past copyright infringement and a likelihood of
future infringement to obtain injunctive relief, as irreparable
2. Andrew F. Spillane, Comment, The Continuing Vitality of the Presumption of
Irreparable Harm in Copyright Cases, 15 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 257, 258 (2011).
3. Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 267 (5th Cir. 1988).
4. Id.
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
6. Jeffrey M. Sanchez, Comment, The Irreparably Harmed Presumption? Why the
Presumption of Irreparable Harm in Trademark Law Will Survive eBay and Winter,
2011 BYU L. REV. 535, 560 (2011).
7. Spillane, supra note 2, at 258.
8. 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
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harm was presumed.9 In eBay, the Supreme Court held that,
even in cases of intellectual property infringement, the
traditional four-factor test of equity must be satisfied before
injunctive relief may properly be granted. The four-factor test
requires: (1) that a plaintiff would suffer irreparable injury in
the absence of an injunction; (2) that remedies available at
law are inadequate to compensate for the injury; (3) that
considering the balance of the hardships between the plaintiff
and the defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4)
that the public interest would not be disserved by the
injunction.10
Spillane argues that the courts should “graft a rebuttable
presumption of irreparable harm into the first eBay factor in
order to regain the traditional rule’s clarity and
predictability.”11
Spillane believes that, without an
injunction, “a mere damage award would effectively license
the infringing behavior, allowing copyright defendants to
infringe a copyright owner’s exclusive rights [so] long as those
defendants are willing and able to pay the consequential or
statutory damages.”12
Spillane presents six arguments why courts should
continue to presume irreparable harm in cases of copyright
infringement.13 He proposes that the presumption should
continue to apply to: (1) protect a copyright holder’s property
right to exclude; (2) remove the issue of judicial distrust
towards defendant’s assertions of voluntary cessation; (3)
maintain the interdependent relationship between property
rights and the protective remedies for those rights; (4)
conserve judicial resources; (5) allow general rules while
prohibiting categorical rules; and (6) follow history and
tradition in equity practice.14
This Comment addresses the weaknesses of Spillane’s
argument that courts should maintain the presumption of
9. CBS Broad Inc. v. EchoStar Commc’ns Corp., 450 F.3d 505, 509 (11th Cir.
2006); Elvis Presley Enterprises, Inc. v. Passport Video, 349 F.3d 622, 627 (9th Cir.
2003); Walt Disney Co. v. Powell, 897 F.2d 565, 567 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Universal City
Studios v. Sony Corp. of America, 659 F.2d 963, 976 (9th Cir. 1981); Elektra Entm’t
Group Inc. v. Brimley, No. 205-134, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56798 at *9 (S.D. Ga. Aug.
15, 2006).
10. eBay, 547 U.S. at 391.
11. Spillane, supra note 2, at 260.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 282-293.
14. Id.
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irreparable harm in the face of the eBay decision. Part I of
this Comment examines the legislative background that led to
copyright law as we know it today, and reviews the pre-eBay
standard for injunctive relief. Part II addresses eBay’s
progression through the federal courts, the standard that
emerged in the Supreme Court’s holding, and the confusion
that has resulted regarding whether the presumption still
applies. Part III demonstrates that the Supreme Court
intended to eliminate the presumption in the eBay decision,
and that this leads to a more equitable result. Part IV raises
separate arguments supporting the proposition that the
presumption’s removal is more equitable. Finally, Part V
provides a brief conclusion of the arguments raised.
I. LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND
Congress has granted federal courts the authority to issue
injunctive relief under 17 USCS § 502.15 The statute states:
“any court having jurisdiction of a civil action arising under
this title may, subject to the provisions of section 1498 of title
28, grant temporary and final injunctions on such terms as it
may deem reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a
copyright.”16 Courts interpret the word “may” to imply that
the issuance of an injunction is subject to a court’s
discretion.17
The Copyright Act itself, however, implies less room for
judicial discretion, stating that, “if any person shall infringe
the copyright in any work protected under the copyright laws
of the United States such person shall be liable. . .to an
injunction restraining such infringement.”18 However, courts
have
traditionally
demanded
certain
preliminary
requirements before issuing injunctive relief.19 Prior to eBay,
in both patent and copyright infringement cases, courts
required a de minimis showing of past infringement, and a
likelihood of future infringement.20 Following eBay, a plaintiff
15. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 433-34 (1984).
16. 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2006).
17.
Yule Kim, Cong. Research Serv., 97-589, Statutory Interpretation: General
Principles and Recent Trends 9 (2008).
18. § 502(a) (2006).
19. Phillips v. Const. Publ’g Co., 72 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 69, 69-70 (N.D. Ga. 1947).
20. CBS Broad Inc. v. EchoStar Commc’ns. Corp., 450 F.3d 505, 509 (11th Cir.
2006); Elvis Presley Enterprises, Inc. v. Passport Video, 349 F.3d 622, 627 (9th Cir.
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must satisfy the four-factor test of equity prior to obtaining
injunctive relief.21
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Emerging Standard For Injunctive Relief in
Infringement Cases
1. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.
In eBay, MercExchange patented a business-method22 that
allows individuals to buy and sell goods from one another
electronically.23 Both eBay and Half.com refused to license
this patent from MercExchange.24 At trial, the jury found
that eBay and Half.com both infringed MercExchange’s
patent.25 Despite the jury’s finding of infringement, the
district court refused to grant injunctive relief because
MercExchange failed to satisfy the four-factor test.26 The
court explained that relief would be improper because of the
“plaintiff’s willingness to license its patents” and the fact that
“its lack of commercial activity in practicing the patents”
demonstrated that the patent holder would not suffer
irreparable harm.27
The court of appeals reversed the district court’s
application of the traditional four-pronged equity test to cases
of patent infringement.28 It held that courts should generally
2003); Walt Disney Co. v. Powell, 897 F.2d 565, 567 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
21. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
22. Business-methods are still patentable in the wake of the Supreme Courts
recent decision in Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3228 (2010). There, the Court ruled
that the term “process,” from 35 USCS § 101, “at least as a textual matter and before
consulting other limitations in the Patent Act and this Court’s precedents, may include
at least some methods of doing business.” Id.
23. eBay, 547 U.S. at 388. MercExchange actually sought to license its business
patent to eBay, but a settlement could not be reached.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 393.
27. Id. Since the advent of “patent trolls,” entities who buy and enforce patents
against infringers without any intention of using the patented invention themselves,
some courts have tried to make it more difficult to win injunctions. Jack C. Schecter,
Are “Patent Trolls” Facing A New Era of Litigation Penalties?, 2011 EMERGING ISSUES
5885 (2011). This likely influenced the district court’s decision in denying the
injunction. Sanchez, supra note 6, at 540.
28. Id. at 393.
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issue injunctions in cases of patent infringement absent
exceptional circumstances.29
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
“whether the Federal Circuit erred in setting forth a general
rule in patent cases that a district court must, absent
exceptional circumstances, issue a permanent injunction after
a finding of infringement.”30 The Court held that neither the
district court nor the court of appeals applied the appropriate
test in determining whether to issue injunctive relief upon a
finding of patent infringement.31 The Court explained that
the district court erred by applying an overly expansive test
that would prevent patent holders that choose only to license
their patents to receive injunctive relief.32 The Court also
explained that the court of appeals erred by failing to apply
the traditional four-factor test.33 Thus, the Court remanded
for further proceedings in accordance with the appropriate
application of the four-factor test for injunctive relief.34
On remand, the district court analyzed “whether a
presumption of irreparable harm upon a finding of validity
and infringement survives the Supreme Court’s opinion
remanding this case.”35 The district court held, “a review of
relevant case law, as well as the language of the Supreme
Court’s decision, supports defendants’ position that such [a]
presumption no longer exists.”36
Virtually all courts have agreed that eBay eliminated the
presumption of irreparable harm in the patent context.37
Further, most courts generally apply eBay’s holding to cases
29. eBay, 547 U.S. at 393.
30. Spillane, supra note 2, at 277.
31. eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 393.
32. Id. The court held that the extra factors taken into account by the district
court were beyond the scope of the four-factor test.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 394.
35. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 568 (E.D. Va. 2007).
36. Id.; See z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437, 440 (E.D. Tex.
2006) (concluding that the language in the Supreme Court’s eBay opinion “does not
imply a presumption, but places the burden of proving irreparable injury upon the
plaintiff”); Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. 2:04-CV-211, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
61600, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2006) (“The eBay decision demonstrates that no
presumption of irreparable harm should automatically follow from a finding of
infringement.”).
37. See Robert Bosch LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 659 F.3d 1142, 1149 (Fed. Cir.
2011); z4 Techs., 434 F. Supp. 2d at 440; Paice LLC, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61600;
Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 532 (1987).
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of copyright infringement.38
2. Winter v. NRDC, Inc.39
In Winter, the National Resources Defense Counsel
(NRDC) sought an injunction against the United States Navy
to prevent the Navy from engaging in antisubmarine warfare
training sessions using mid-frequency active sonar off the
coast of California.40 The NRDC asserted that the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) required the Navy
to prepare an environmental impact statement assessing the
impact of these naval exercises on marine mammals prior to
engaging in the training exercises.41 Both the district court
and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the
injunction based, at least in part, on NRDC establishing a
possibility of irreparable harm.42
The Supreme Court,
reversing the court of appeals, explained that injunctive relief
should be granted only when irreparable injury is likely, not
merely possible.43
Although Winter did not involve any issue of intellectual
property rights, several courts have cited to it in holding that
the presumption of irreparable harm is no longer valid.44 For
example, in Flexible Lifeline Sys. v. Precision Lift, Inc.,45 the
Ninth Circuit vacated an injunction issued by the district
court because the plaintiff failed to demonstrate irreparable
38. Peter Letterese & Assocs. v. World Inst. of Scientology Enters. Int’l, 533 F.3d
1287, 1323 (11th Cir. 2008); Christopher Phelps & Assocs. v. Galloway, 492 F.3d 532,
543 (4th Cir. 2007) (“The Supreme Court[‘s eBay decision] reaffirmed the traditional
showing that a plaintiff must make in order to obtain a permanent injunction in any
type of case, including a patent or copyright case”); See also Metro-GoldwynMayerStudios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 518 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1208-10 (C.D. Cal. 2007).
39. 555 U.S. 7 (2008).
40. Id. at 8.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 22 (Stating that “issuing a preliminary injunction based only on a
possibility of irreparable harm is inconsistent with our characterization of injunctive
relief as an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that
the plaintiff is entitled to such relief. Our frequently reiterated standard requires
plaintiffs seeking preliminary relief to demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely in
the absence of an injunction.”).
44. Flexible Lifeline Sys. v. Precision Lift, Inc., 654 F.3d 989, 995 (9th Cir. 2011);
Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 77-78 (2d. Cir. 2010); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios,
Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 518 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1209 (C.D. Cal. 2007); Apple Inc. v. Psystar
Corp., 673 F. Supp. 2d 943, 948 (2009).
45. 654 F.3d at 995.
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harm in a copyright infringement case. According to the
court, “after the Supreme Court’s eBay and Winter decisions
in 2006 and 2008, this circuit’s long-standing practice of
presuming irreparable harm upon the showing of likelihood of
success on the merits in a copyright infringement case is no
longer good law.”46
B. Recent Court Approaches to the Presumption of Irreparable
Harm
In the wake of eBay and Winter, courts have taken two
different approaches to the traditionally recognized
presumption of irreparable harm in copyright infringement
cases.47 Some courts hold that the presumption is no longer
valid,48 while others maintain the presumption’s validity in
cases of copyright infringement.49
1. The Presumption is No Longer Valid
In Salinger v. Colting, J.D. Salinger brought a copyright
infringement suit against an author for allegedly copying
scenes, characters, events, and other elements from Salinger’s
classic novel, Catcher in the Rye.50 Upon establishing a prima
facie case of copyright infringement, Salinger sought
injunctive relief from the district court.51
The court,
interpreting eBay to affect only cases of patent infringement,
presumed irreparable harm and issued a preliminary
injunction.52 On appeal, the Second Circuit vacated the
injunction, holding that eBay equally applies to cases of

46. Id.; See also Salinger, 607 F.3d at 77-78;MGM Studios, 518 F. Supp. 2d at
1209; Apple, 673 F. Supp. 2d at 948.
47. Compare Salinger, 607 F.3d at 77-78; GM Studios, 518 F. Supp. 2d at 1209;
Apple, 673 F. Supp. 2d at 948; with courts still holding of the presumption: Capitol
Records, Inc. v. Zahn, No. 3:06-0212, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11426 at *10 (M.D. Tenn.
Feb. 16, 2007). Microsoft Corp. v. McGee, 490 F. Supp. 2d 874, 877 (2007).
48. Salinger, 607 F.3d at 77-78; MGM Studios, 518 F. Supp. 2d at 1209; Apple, 673
F. Supp. 2d at 948.
49. McGee, 490 F. Supp. 2d at 882; Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, No.
07-cv-11446, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115734 at *4 (D. Mass. Dec. 7, 2009); Microsoft
Corp. v. Atek 3000 Computer, Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56689 (E.D.N.Y. July 23,
2008); Zahn, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11426 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 16, 2007).
50. Salinger, 607 F.3d at 77-78.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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copyright infringement53 stating that eBay “eviscerated the
presumption of irreparable harm upon a showing of a
likelihood of success on the merits in copyright cases.” 54
Similarly, courts in the Fourth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits
have directly rejected the presumption in cases of copyright
infringement.55
2. The Presumption Survives in the Copyright Context
In Microsoft v. McGee,56
the defendant distributed
counterfeit and infringing software programs that were
developed and licensed by the plaintiff. Once the plaintiff
demonstrated a prima facie case of infringement, the court
reviewed the four-pronged test set forth in eBay, holding that
under the first prong,57 irreparable harm is automatically
presumed upon any showing of copyright infringement.58
District courts in the First, Second, and Sixth Circuits have
reached the same conclusion.59 However, none of these courts
adequately explain its conclusion. Rather, these courts
simply cite to pre-eBay cases as precedent for the
presumption, which includes cases that are no longer good
law.60

53. Id.
54. Sanchez, supra note 6, at 545.
55.
Peter Letterese & Assocs. v. World Inst. of Scientology Enters. Int’l, 533 F.3d
1287, 1323 (11th Cir. 2008); Christopher Phelps & Assocs. v. Galloway, 492 F.3d 532,
543 (4th Cir. 2007) (The Supreme Court’s eBay decision reaffirmed the traditional
showing that a plaintiff must make in order to obtain a permanent injunction in any
type of case, including a patent or copyright case.); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc.
v. Grokster, Ltd., 518 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1208-10 (C.D. Cal. 2007); Arlington Indus. v.
Bridgeport Fittings, Inc., No. 3:06-CV-1105, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77592 at *24 (M.D.
Pa. July 18, 2011).
56. 490 F. Supp. 2d 874, 877 (S.D. Ohio 2007).
57. The first prong: that the plaintiff has suffered an irreparable injury.
58. McGee, 490 F. Supp. 2d at 877.
59. Id. at 882; Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
115734 (D. Mass. Dec. 7, 2009); Microsoft Corp. v. Atek 3000 Computer, Inc., No. 07-cv11446, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56689 at *4 (E.D.N.Y. July 23, 2008); Capitol Records,
Inc. v. Zahn, NO. 3:06-0212, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11426 at *10 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 16,
2007).
60. See McGee, 490 F. Supp. 2d at 882 (citing Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes,
82 F.Supp.2d 211, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)); Microsoft, No. 06-cv-6403, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 56689 at *15 (quoting MyWebGrocer, LLC v. Hometown Info, Inc., 375 F.3d 190,
193 (2d Cir. 2004)).
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III. ARGUMENTS DEMONSTRATING THAT THE PRESUMPTION OF
IRREPARABLE HARM IS NO LONGER VALID
Although the Supreme Court did not directly address
whether its eBay decision intended to abrogate the
presumption of irreparable harm, most courts agree that such
an interpretation is warranted.61 Admittedly, however, the
eBay decision did allow room for some confusion by failing to
specifically state its holding applies to copyright infringement
cases. This failure allowed commentators such as Spillane to
propose justifications for not applying the presumption to the
copyright context.62
However, these justifications are
insufficient to overcome the reality that the presumption “has
left the building.”63

A. Protecting the Right to Exclude of a Copyright Holder
1. Spillane’s Argument in Favor of the Presumption’s
Validity
Spillane argues in favor of the presumption’s validity.
Copyright infringement involves the invasion of a copyright
holder’s right to the exclusive use of his work.64 A copyright’s
exclusivity can be characterized by two points: (1) the
copyright’s nature as a monopoly; and (2) the method used in
policing infringement of a copyright.65
The Constitution authorizes Congress to pass legislation
on copyright matters.66 With this power, Congress enacted
the Copyright Act granting authors an “exclusive right” to
their copyrightable works.67 This exclusivity provides a
monopolistic right to a copyright owner, barring others from
use of their work. However, a monopoly ceases to exist when
parties other than the copyright owner use the copyrighted

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

See supra notes, 36-38.
Spillane, supra note 2, at 282-285.
Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Passport Video, 349 F.3d 622, 627 (9th Cir. 2003).
Spillane, supra note 2, at 282.
Id.at 283.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Spillane, supra note 2, at 283; 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
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content.68 Thus, requiring irreparable harm before granting
injunctive relief weakens this monopoly, making it easier to
infringe without consequences.
Furthermore, by granting causes of action in instances of
infringement, the Copyright Act imposes supervision rights
upon the copyright holder.69 While in many instances of
infringement:
[a damage award] may account for the losses resulting from the
infringement and profits the defendants may have garnered from
their infringing activities, and may deter future infringement by
making the cost of that activity prohibitive, a mere damage award
runs the risk of judicially licensing infringement where the
Copyright Act otherwise has not provided for compulsory licenses. 70

In other words, defendants may find it better to infringe
and pay for the resulting damage judgments, particularly if
the infringer is a corporation with sufficient capital to bear
the cost of such judgments.71 According to Justice Scalia,
allowing only monetary damages to be awarded is equivalent
to the judiciary saying to the patent holder, “Here, take your
money,” and to the infringer, “You, God bless you, go continue
to violate the patent.”72 This scenario would force copyright
owners to constantly litigate in order to protect their exclusive
rights against wealthy companies that can easily afford such
litigation.73
As such, Spillane argues that the continuance of the
presumption of irreparable harm will protect this monopoly
and appropriately address these supervision concerns. Thus,
he finds that the presumptions’ viability in copyright actions
should survive the eBay decision.74
2. Argument Against the Presumption’s Validity
Through the ideological principles and intent of the
Supreme Court’s decision in eBay, it is clear that the
presumption should continue neither in patent infringement
68. Spillane, supra note 2, at 283.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 284.
71. Id. at 285.
72. Spillane, supra note 2, at 276 (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 27,
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (No. 05-130)).
73. Id.at 275.
74. Id. at 292.
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nor copyright infringement. In making this argument, this
section first addresses the issue of a copyright holder’s
monopoly and then addresses the copyright holder’s selfsupervising role. Finally, a review of the Court’s language in
eBay clearly indicates that the presumption should not be
applied in the copyright context.
a. Copyright Holder’s Monopoly
Congress has granted both patent and copyright owners
an exclusive monopoly.75 The crux of a copyright holder’s
“exclusive right” to the property is found under the Copyright
Act. Congress virtually granted this same protection to
patent holders in the Patent Act.76 That is, under the same
Constitutional Clause used to create the Copyright Act,
Congress enacted the Patent Act granting the patent holder
an exclusive monopoly as well.77 While Spillane argues that
an injunction is required to protect this monopoly,78 his view
contradicts the holding of the Supreme Court.79 Spillane
admits that the eBay ruling removes the presumption in the
patent context. However, he argues that this ruling does not
extend to copyrights.80 Nevertheless, since rights to both a
copyright and a patent arise from the same Constitutional
Clause, and both Acts are framed in similar language, it is
inappropriate to demand different standards for injunctive
relief between these two species of intellectual property.
Thus, just as the Supreme Court requires a showing of
irreparable harm upon a finding of patent infringement,
despite the “monopoly” granted to patent holders by Congress,
a copyright holder’s “monopoly,” which is no more powerful
than a patent owner’s, does not warrant a different standard.
b. Self-Policing
Patents and copyrights share the same infringement
75. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006); 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2006).
76. § 261.
77. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006).
78. Spillane, supra note 2, at 283.
79. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 568 (E. D. Va. 2007).
80. Spillane, supra note 2, at 279-82. The only argument Spillane addresses is the
split of authority over whether the presumption is removed in the copyright context. Id.
He does not contend that the presumption remains in the patent context. Id.
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concerns and the same self-policing mechanisms. In Section
281, Congress awarded self-policing rights to patent holders
and granted them causes of action to protect against patent
infringement.81 Similarly, in Section 501, Congress granted
copyright holders causes of action in cases of infringement,
allowing them to self-supervise their creations.82 Yet, the
eBay Court did not believe that a prima facie case of patent
infringement necessarily justifies an injunction.83 In other
words, the Supreme Court was not concerned that
corporations with enough capital may choose to keep
infringing at the expense of simply paying penalty fees.84
Similarly, fear of mandated copyright infringement is no
greater a concern; it is therefore not deserving of stronger
protection than patent infringement through a presumption of
irreparable harm. Thus, it is insufficient to say that in the
copyright realm, which has similar policing mechanisms to
patent infringement and the same capability to infringe and
pay, the presumption of irreparable harm should remain
despite the Court’s decision in eBay.
Moreover, the premise that monetary damages are often
insufficient is misleading.85 It is true that in contrast to a
patent holder, who may seek punitive damages upon a prima
facie showing of patent infringement,86 the majority of courts
hold that a copyright holder may not pursue punitive
damages.87 However, a copyright holder is entitled to either
actual damages along with the additional profits of the
infringer, or statutory damages.88 When actual damages are
awarded, the victim of copyright infringement is made
81. 35 U.S.C. § 281 (2006).
82. 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (2006).
83. eBay v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388,395 (2006) (stating the fact that in
the vast majority of cases courts have granted injunctive relief upon a showing of
patent infringement “does not entitle a patentee to a permanent injunction or justify a
general rule that such injunctions should issue); see also Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar
Pharmaceutical Co., 733 F.2d 858, 865-867 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
84. See eBay, 547 U.S. at 396.
85. Spillane raises the argument that rich corporations could easily infringe and
pay even the maximum damages while continuing to make a profit. Spillane, supra text
accompanying note 2, at 284-85.
86. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006).
87. Bucklew v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., 329 F.3d 923, 931 (7th Cir. 2003);
Epcon Group, Inc. v. Danburry Farms, Inc., 28 F. App’x 127, 130 (3d Cir. 2002);
Leutwyler v. Royal Hashemite Court of Jordan, 184 F. Supp. 2d 303, 308 (S.D.N.Y.
2001).
88. 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2006).
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whole.89 However, in cases granting statutory damages to
copyright holders, it is within the courts’ discretion to award a
minimum of $750 and a maximum of $30,000 per
infringement.90 Furthermore, upon willful infringement, the
court may impose damage awards of up to $150,000 per
infringement.91 In fact, these damages have been specifically
created to provide adequate compensation to the copyright
holder, to discourage wrongful conduct, and to deter
infringements.92 Thus, even though copyright infringements
cannot lead to the kinds of punitive damages awarded for
patent infringements, large corporations will not be more
inclined to engage in copyright infringement because
copyright infringement can still result in significant financial
loss.
c. Direct Interpretation of eBay Implies its Holding
Applies Equally to Copyright Infringement
In eBay, the Supreme Court openly declared that the fourpronged test for injunctive relief “is consistent with our
treatment of injunctions under the Copyright Act.”93 The
Court further stated that these traditional principles of equity
apply, “in patent disputes no less than in other cases
governed by such standards.”94 Thus, the only relevant issue
is whether the Supreme Court in eBay removed the
presumption altogether in cases of patent infringement since
that would also remove the presumption from copyright
infringement injunctions. As the district court in eBay found
on remand, “a review of relevant case law, as well as the
89. See e.g., Wal-Mart Stores v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 208 (2000), (Wal-Mart
infringed upon Samara Brothers’ copyrights by selling knockoffs. In granting actual
damages to the Samara Brothers, the jury awarded the full $1.15 million of Wal-Mart’s
gleaned profits from copying Samara Brothers’ materials, in addition to fees and costs.
Id.
90. § 504(c)(1).
91. Id. In contrast, in the Ninth Circuit courts go so far as to hold statutory
damages must be in excess of the amount that would have been awarded as profits or
actual damages alone, assuming either profits or actual damages have already been
ascertained. Kamar Int’l v. Russ Berrie & Co., 829 F.2d 783, 786 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing
Frank Music Corp. v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 772 F.2d 505, 520 (9th Cir. 1985)).
92.
“The statutory purposes of the Copyright Act of 1909 are to provide adequate
compensation to the copyright holder and to discourage wrongful conduct and deter
infringements.” Kamar Int’l, 829 F.2d at 786.
93. eBay v. MerckExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392 (2006).
94. Id. at 394 (Roberts, CJ, concurring).
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language of the Supreme Court’s decision, supports the
position that such presumption no longer exists.”95
Accordingly, courts are erring by continuing to apply the
presumption.
d. Summation
Spillane’s arguments are not sufficient for the
presumption to survive the eBay decision. Patents and
copyrights share the same bundle of rights granted by
Congress.96 Furthermore, they both have similar self-policing
mechanisms and in both types of infringement cases, the
subsequent monetary damages available to a plaintiff are
sufficient to deter corporations with large amounts of
capital.97 Hence, there is no reason to adopt Spillane’s
proposal and apply different standards between patent law
and copyright law.98 Finally, the Court’s decision in eBay
demonstrates that its ruling should apply equally to both
copyright infringement and patent infringement.99
B. Judicial Distrust of Defendant’s Assertions of Voluntary
Cessation
1. Spillane’s Arguments in Favor of the Presumption’s
Validity
In prior cases of copyright infringement, courts have held
that defendants lack good faith in their assertions that they
will stop their infringing activity.100 They have also held that
the threat of future infringement undermines the exclusive
right granted to copyright holders such that injunctive relief
is required to protect this right.101 Both in Tanenbaum102 and

95. See supra notes 36-38.
96. See infra Part III., Section A, Subpart 2, Subsection b.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, No. 07-cv-11446, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 115734 at *4 (D. Mass. Dec. 7, 2009); Walt Disney Co. v. Powell, 897 F.2d 565,
567 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
101. Spillane, supra note 2, at 284-85.
102. In Tenenbaum, the defendant used an audio sharing device to distribute 381
infringed audio files over the internet. 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115734.
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Walt Disney Co.103 the defendants infringed upon issued
copyrights. In both cases, the courts imposed permanent
injunctions to ensure infringement protection based on the
belief that the defendants would otherwise further infringe
the plaintiffs’ copyrights.104
Spillane argues that a
presumption of irreparable harm will impose a burden of
proof upon a defendant to provide that his or her infringing
activity does not demonstrate irreparable harm.105 With this
burden, a judge may more accurately assess a defendant’s
assertions that he or she will cease the infringing activity
once the case ends.106
2. Argument against the Presumption’s Validity
Spillane points only to Tanenbaum and Walt Disney Co. in
making his argument because there are no other cases
asserting this judicial distrust principle. Every other court
that has addressed this issue has interpreted the Supreme
Court to have rejected the notion that an injunction
automatically
follows
a
copyright
infringement
determination.107 As such, cases prior to eBay, such as Walt
Disney Co. have been overruled and lack any persuasive force.
Moreover, any case to the contrary decided after eBay is
simply not in accordance with precedent in light of the above
arguments.108 Thus, Tanenbaum was mistaken in granting
the injunction without a further demonstration of irreparable
harm regardless of the possibility of continued infringement.

103. In Walt Disney, the defendant produced t-shirts with infringed symbols such as
Playboy, the Hard Rock Café, Disney, and Georgetown University in quantities that the
court could not assess accurately. Walt Disney, 897 F.2d at 567.
104. Tenenbaum, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115734; Walt Disney, 897 F.2d at 567.
105. Spillane, supra note 2, at 287.
106. Id.
107. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 653 F.3d 976, 981 (9th Cir. 2011); Robert Bosch
LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 659 F.3d. 1142, 1148-49 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Salinger v. Colting,
607 F.3d 68, 78 (2d Cir. 2010); Apple v. Psystar Corp., 673 F. Supp. 2d 943, 948 (N. D.
Cal. 2009); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 518 F. Supp. 2d 1197,
1209 (C.D. Cal. 2007).
108. Wilson v. Brennan, 666 F. Supp. 2d 1242, 1265 (D.N.M. 2009) aff’d, 390 F.
App’x 780 (10th Cir. 2010) (expressly stating that eBay rejects the notion that the
injunction automatically follows a copyright infringement); Christopher Phelps &
Assocs., LLC v. Galloway, 477 F.3d 128, 138 (4th Cir. 2007).
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C. The Interdependent Relationship Between Rights and
Remedies
1. Spillane’s Arguments in Favor of the Presumption’s
Validity
A reciprocal relationship exists between the rights and the
remedies for violation of those rights; thus, a powerful
remedial approach should exist in the event of copyright
infringement, given its nature as an exclusive right. 109
According to Spillane, the substance of rights asserted often
defines the nature and scope of the remedies for that right in
the event of its violation because the proper remedy
ultimately determines how and whether the right is properly
vindicated.110 “Copyright owners hold a bundle of exclusive
rights under 17 U.S.C. § 106, and these rights may cease to be
exclusive where the Copyright Act does not provide [an
appropriate remedy] when infringing behavior continues.”111
Thus, because a copyright holder receives an explicit grant of
exclusive rights, it deserves a strong reciprocal remedy in
cases of infringement, such as injunctive relief.112 Therefore,
Spillane argues for continuation of the presumption in cases
of copyright infringement.113
2. Argument Against the Presumption’s Validity
The Supreme Court in eBay agrees that a strong right
deserves a strong remedy.114 There, the Court noted that
injunctions are warranted in cases of copyright infringement
considering the substance of a copyright holder’s right;
nevertheless, injunctive relief requires a sufficient showing of
irreparable harm.115 eBay’s requirement that irreparable
harm be demonstrated rather than presumed changes only
the circumstances in which a court is allowed to find that
irreparable harm exists. Therefore, the substantive right
itself is not diminished.
Rather, the factual standard
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Spillane, supra note 2, at 287-88.
Id.
Id. at 288.
Id.
See id. at 289.
See eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391-93 (2006).
Id.
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required to warrant this strong remedy has been raised to a
likelihood of irreparable harm, as opposed to a mere
possibility of such harm occurring. It is this standard that
allows for a more equitable result.
D. Conserving Judicial Resources by Recognizing Trends
1. Spillane’s Argument in Favor of the Presumption’s
Validity
Spillane also argues that “[t]he presumption also finds
worth in its conservation of judicial resources.” 116 Because
irreparable harm will normally flow from cases of copyright
infringement, presuming irreparable harm once infringement
is shown saves time and money.117 Further, allowing the
presumption to be rebutted increases accuracy in the
presumably small set of cases that deviate from the norm.118
As such, it would be more beneficial for courts themselves to
continue the presumption.
2. Argument against the Presumption’s Validity
Allowing the presumption to continue would enable acrossthe-board119 infringement litigation costs to continue their
meteoric rise. While the presumption existed in copyright
cases, it virtually guaranteed an injunction in each case
where the plaintiffs were able to prove past infringement.120
With this fact becoming known, copyright owners began
leveraging copyrights of little value into lucrative
settlements.121 As such, continuing to presume irreparable
harm furthers abusive copyright litigation. In fact, there are
several aspects of copyright litigation that make it
particularly conducive to frivolous or abusive litigation,
demonstrating that removal of the presumption is more cost
116. Spillane, supra note 2, at 289.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. This includes increasing costs for plaintiffs, defendants, and the judiciary.
120. “From at least the early 19th century, courts have granted injunctive relief
upon a finding of infringement in the vast majority of patent cases.” eBay, Inc. v.
MercExchange L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 395 (2006) (Roberts, CJ., concurring).
121. Michael J. Meurer, Controlling Opportunistic and Anti-Competitive Intellectual
Property Litigation, 44 B.C. L. REV. 509, 512-20 (2003).
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effective.
First, copyright law asks the fact-finder to make a difficult
subjective decision concerning whether the defendant
unlawfully appropriated the plaintiff’s expressive work.122
Aside from the already vague standards in place to determine
whether infringement has occurred, trials often feature
conflicting expert testimony about matters relevant to the
scope of an intellectual property right.123 Compounding these
problems is the risk of error by judges and juries.124 Trial
errors are difficult to correct in intellectual property litigation
because the complexity of the evidence can make it difficult
for a deserving defendant to win summary judgment or even
prevail at trial.125 Thus, high variance in the scope of rights
makes it profitable for intellectual property plaintiffs with
apparently narrow rights to gamble that a court will grant
them broad rights.
Second, a weak lawsuit presents a credible threat to a
defendant for whom it is difficult to distinguish weak lawsuits
from strong ones.126 A plaintiff with a weak lawsuit can
successfully bluff a defendant because, in the early stages of
intellectual property litigation, the plaintiff is likely to have
better information about the scope and validity of its claim.127
Third, a weak lawsuit may cause the defendant to settle—
either to avoid the nuisance of mounting a defense or because
the cost of a strong defense threatens the defendant’s
solvency.128 Alternatively, the threat of a weak lawsuit may
deter entry into a given market if the plaintiff establishes a
reputation for prosecuting weak suits through to the end.129 A
plaintiff with a predatory reputation may rationally view
losing a weak lawsuit as a profitable investment in that
reputation.130
Further, allowing the presumption of irreparable harm to
remain enables copyright litigation costs to continue rising
122. Brief for America Online, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at
10, eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (No. 05-130).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Brief for America Online, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at
10, eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (No. 05-130).
128.
Id. at 11.
129.
Id.
130.
Id.
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given the fact that no demonstration of irreparable harm need
be shown. According to economic reports, copyright litigation
is expected to cost at least $600,000 for each party. 131 In fact,
according to surveys taken by the American Intellectual
Property Lawyers Association, from 2001 until 2007 there has
been a 32% rise in copyright litigation.132 One way to stem
this continued rise in litigation is to remove the presumption.
This would require that each case have merit without
presuming the merits, thereby substantially decreasing the
incentives for infringement litigation.
Fourth, well aware of the above-mentioned opportunities,
professional copyright litigants opportunistically buy up
copyrights solely for the purpose of suing past and future
infringers.133 Such parties are known as copyright trolls.134 In
Video-Cinema Films, Inc. v. CNN, Inc., the plaintiff
purchased the G.I. Joe copyright, with a clause that
ownership would retroactively take effect two years prior to
the date of purchase.135 The plaintiff then sued several news
organizations for infringement for showing snippets of the
films.136 Another instance of copyright trolling appeared in
Righthaven LLC.137 There, the plaintiffs scoured the internet
seeking online infringements of the Las Vegas Review
Journal, purchased those copyrights, and commenced suit on
the infringers.138 Requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate actual
harm, would decrease copyright trolling because, in most
cases of trolling, irreparable harm is not present.
Thus, allowing the presumption of irreparable harm to
remain would in fact increase overall costs. First, it enables
potential plaintiffs to gamble on winning because the
difficulty in understanding complex litigation has led to a
131. Sanford E. Warren Jr., Intellectual Property Litigation Rising: How to Protect
Your Company’s Financial Health, IRMI (Sept. 2009), http://www.irmi.com/expert/
articles/2009/warren09-intellectual-property-law.aspx (citing AIPLA Report of the
Economic Survey, 25-26 (2007)).
132. Id.
133. Ashby Jones, Vegas, Baby! Ruling a Possible Boon to ‘Copyright-Troll’ Suits,
WSJ L. BLOG (Sept. 3, 2010, 3:11 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/09/03/vegas-babyruling-a-possible-boon-to-copyright-troll-suits/.
134. Id.
135. 98 Civ. 7128, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15937, at *7-8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2001).
136. Id.at 14.
137. Jones, supra note 133. Righthaven filed over 115 lawsuits of copyright
infringement. Id.
138. Id.
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high variance of results. Second, it enables a plaintiff to bluff
the defendant into settling because it does not need to
demonstrate irreparable harm, and is thus in a better position
than the defendant to know the likely outcome. Third, the
prohibitive cost of copyright litigation enables one to threaten
suit in order to demand a settlement. Finally, allowing the
presumption to continue would increase the growing problem
of copyright trolls. As such, not only would the continuance of
the presumption increase costs on the litigants and the
industry, it would also increasingly burden an already
overstretched court system.
E. Allowing General Rules While Prohibiting Categorical
Rules
1. Spillane’s Argument in Favor of the Presumption’s
Validity
The eBay Court reversed the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit because it incorrectly asserted
a “‘general rule’ unique to patent disputes ‘that a permanent
injunction will issue once infringement and validity have been
adjudged.’”139 Some decisions have looked to this language
from the Supreme Court to indicate a basic rejection of
general rules, thereby justifying, for those courts, the
elimination of the presumption.140 However, Spillane argues
that general rules are practically inevitable.141 That is, “a
central tenet of common law jurisprudence is to apply
preexisting generalized rules to a specific set of
circumstances, to apply the precedent created by the first
application to the next case, and so on.”142 Consequently, the
logic of these courts in denying the presumption is misguided
because the Supreme Court cannot have rejected the entire
notion of general rules. Rather, a rebuttable presumption is
appropriate so that defendants must show that a copyright
owner can be made whole through a monetary recovery,
thereby rendering injunctive relief unnecessary.143
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 393-94 (2006).
Spillane, supra note 2, at 289-290.
Id. at 290.
Id.
Id.
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2. Argument against the Presumption’s Validity
The Supreme Court did not remove the presumption
merely because the lower courts asserted general rules in
their decisions. In eBay, the lower courts placed overbroad
rules on patent infringement cases.144 The District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia adopted expansive principles
suggesting that injunctive relief could not issue in a broad
swath of cases.145 The Federal Circuit held that a permanent
injunction would always issue upon infringement.146 These
courts both adopted expansive principles, and the Supreme
Court merely noted that these principles do not comply with
the four-factor test of equity.147 The Court was not proposing
that general/categorical rules never be used; rather, in this
instance, both courts had invented their own general rules
rather than applying the appropriate four-factor test.148 As
such, eBay does not affect whether the rebuttable
presumption that Spillane proposes is or is not a general rule.
Further, Spillane fails to cite to any court that uses this
general rule justification to support the removal of the
presumption.149 This is probably because most courts simply
justify the removal of the presumption through analysis into
the intent of the Supreme Court’s eBay decision as well as for
reasons of equity.
F. Following the History and Tradition of Equity Practice
1. Spillane’s Argument in Favor of the Presumption’s
Validity
In eBay, the Court applied the traditional four-factor test
“historically employed by courts of equity.”150 However,
Spillane argues that a court “laboriously marching through
equitable factors in copyright infringement suits” does not
accurately reflect the history and tradition referred to by the
144. eBay, 547 U.S. 393-94.
145. Specifically, the court looked to whether a patent holder has a willingness to
license its patents and a lack of commercial activity in practicing the patents. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 394.
148. Id.
149. See Spillane, supra note 2, at 289-90.
150. eBay, 547 U.S. at 390.
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Court.151 In fact, he cites a nineteenth-century treatise that
claims equitable remedies are superior to actions at law in
vindicating copyrights.152 The treatise discusses that “a court
of equity is manifestly the better forum for the protection of a
copyright, since a court of law cannot afford as ample
redress . . . for the prevention of a threatened or anticipated
violation in the future.”153 In addition, the treatise also
explains that granting injunctions furthers “preventing
mischief” and avoids “vexatious litigation.”154
Moreover,
historical records suggest that legal remedies are
categorically inadequate in copyright infringement cases.155
Spillane harmonizes these historic principles with current
Supreme Court precedent rather awkwardly. Instead of
giving plain meaning to the eBay Courts’ statement that a
plaintiff “must satisfy a four-factor test,” Spillane interprets
this as not itself requiring that the plaintiff “prove” each
factor.156 Rather, Spillane’s interpretation provides that only
in instances where a defendant resists injunction is a plaintiff
required to prove the four factors.157 Thus, according to this
interpretation of eBay, the history referred to by the Court
indicates that injunctions should be commonplace in
instances of copyright infringement, further supporting the
contention that the presumption should remain valid.
2. Argument against the Presumption’s Validity
The treatises mentioned by Spillane discussing the early
development of law in both the English and American system
are not an accurate portrayal of copyright infringement as it
exists today. The Supreme Court stated that “given the
difficulty of protecting a right to exclude through monetary
remedies that allow an infringer to use an invention against
the owner’s wishes,” it is not surprising that most cases in the
151. Spillane, supra note 2, at 290.
152. Id. (quoting JAMES L. HIGH, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF INJUNCTIONS 746 (3d
ed. 1890)).
153. Id.
154. Id. (quoting JAMES L. HIGH, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF INJUNCTIONS 746 (3d
ed. 1890)).
155.
Id. at 291 (citing H. Tomas Gomez-Arostegui, What History Teaches Us About
Copyright Injunctions and the Inadequate-Remedy-at-Law Requirement, 81 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1197 (2008)).
156. Id. at 292.
157. Id.
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past have granted injunctions upon a showing of
infringement.158 However, monetary damages today prevent
mischievous litigation, and therefore a demonstration of
irreparable harm should be required before granting
injunctive relief. Moreover, as discussed above, removing the
presumption would lower costs as compared to routine
granting of injunctions in copyright infringement cases.159
Further, while Chief Justice Roberts did mention cases
from to the 19th century, it is clear that, when the Court
determined that the traditional equity factors would apply in
this context, it did not mean we should follow the precedent
established in that time period.160
In fact, in GomezArostegui’s article, which Spillane uses as a foundation for his
argument, the author states “Chief Justice Roberts’s
concurrence neither indicates what history we should
examine (American and/or English) nor how far back to
look.”161 However, it is clear from the Court’s choice of
precedent that the Court was discussing only recent American
history and the recent traditions set forth from these cases.162
Thus, the fact that historical cases from the 19th century
granted injunctions in all cases of copyright infringement has
no substantive bearing on the law as eBay applies it.
Although injunctive relief was granted in most cases of
infringement in the past, that reality does not entitle a
copyrightee to a permanent injunction or justify a general
rule that such injunctions should issue.163 Therefore, there is
no need to find a non-obvious, contradictory interpretation of
the Supreme Court’s language, and harmonize it with English
or early American case treatment of copyright infringement
as Spillane attempts.

158. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 395 (2006) (Roberts, CJ.,
concurring).
159. See supra Part III., Section D., Subpart 2.
160. eBay, 547 U.S. at 395 (Roberts, C.J., concurring); See infra note 162.
161. H. Tomas Gomez-Arostegui, What History Teaches Us About Copyright
Injunctions and the Inadequate-Remedy-At-Law Requirement, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1197,
1210 (2008).
162. eBay, 547 U.S. 391. This is evident from the Courts choice of precedent: Amoco
Production Co. v. Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987); Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo,
456 U.S. 305, 311-13 (1982).
163. See eBay, 547 U.S. at 395. (Roberts, CJ., concurring).
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IV. SUPPLEMENTAL ARGUMENTS FAVORING THE REMOVAL OF
THE PRESUMPTION OF IRREPARABLE HARM IN CASES OF
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
Other arguments also demonstrate that the removal of the
presumption will lead to more equitable results. Specifically,
presuming irreparable harm prevents a defendant from the
appropriate discovery required in establishing defenses to
infringement such as fair use and copyright misuse.164 In
addition, a historical look at the origins of this presumption
demonstrates its questionability even pre-eBay.165 Thus, even
in the copyright context, the effect of the eBay decision in
removing the presumption is well warranted.
The copyright misuse defense is an invalidity defense to
copyright infringement that cannot be established without
discovery. This defense prohibits recovery for copyright
infringement when the copyright holder uses the copyright “to
secure an exclusive right or limited monopoly not granted by
the Copyright Office and which is contrary to public policy.”166
In order to adequately assert this defense, the defendant must
first find existence of a period of copyright misuse.167 Then,
the defendant must determine whether his or her infringing
use occurred during this period of misuse by the copyright
holder.168
Both inquiries are matters of fact requiring
discovery—sometimes, significant amounts of discovery—from
the copyright holder.
Another invalidity defense that cannot be fairly
established without substantial discovery is the fair use
defense. The indicative factors used in determining fair use
are (1) consideration of all the evidence; (2) the value of the
164. See Roy H. Wepner & Richard W. Ellis, The Federal Circuit’s Presumptively
Erroneous Presumption of Irreparable Harm, 6 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 147, 148
(2004). The arguments discussed in this section originated in this article. Whereas the
ideas expressed in this article primarily addressed patent infringement, similar
concepts relate to cases of copyright infringement.
165. Id. at 166-168.
166. Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 977 (4th Cir. 1990)(citing
Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492 (1942)); Karen E. Georgenson,
Reverse Engineering of Copyrighted Software: Fair Use or Misuse?, 5 ALB. L.J. SCI. &
TECH. 291, 312-313 (1996).
167. Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. AMA, 121 F.3d 516, 520 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing
Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 979); Altera Corp. v. Clear Logic, Inc., 424 F.3d 1079, 1090 (9th
Cir. 2005).
168. AMA, 121 F.3d at 520 (citing Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 979); Altera Corp., 424
F.3d at 1090.
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copyrighted material and effect on distribution of objects of
the original work; (3) the nature and objects of the selections
made; (4) the quantity and value of material used; and (5) the
degree in which the use may prejudice sales of the original
work.169
Although some of these facts may be easily
accessible, it may be impossible to establish certain facts
without obtaining documents from, and deposing witnesses
associated with the copyright holder. Thus, maintaining the
presumption would prevent a defendant from asserting a
valid fair use defense. As such, it is clearly more equitable to
remove the presumption on this ground as well.
A historical view of the presumption’s origins shows that
even its general application to copyright cases is weak. In
American Metropolitan Enterprises, Inc. v. Warner Bros.
Records, Inc.,170 the first case to recognize the presumption in
copyright cases, the court extended this presumption directly
from prior case law, indicating that a copyright holder is
entitled to a preliminary injunction without a detailed
showing of irreparable harm.171 However, the fact that a
detailed showing alone is not required to gain injunctive relief
is a far cry from allowing a presumption that does not require
any showing of irreparable harm.172 Indeed, such a logical
leap is unwarranted. As such, in light of the above arguments
demonstrating the detriment of the presumption in copyright
infringement cases, the fact that even its foundational
precedent is arguable supports the notion of its removal.

169. Mathews Conveyer Co. v. Palmer-Bee Co., 135 F.2d 73, 85 (6th Cir.
1943)(stating that “fair use is to be determined by a consideration of all of the evidence,
and among other elements entering into the determination of the issue, are the extent
and relative value of copyrighted material, and the effect upon the distribution of
objects of the original work. Whether a particular use of a copyrighted article, without
permission of the owner, is a fair use, depends upon the circumstances of the particular
case, and the court must look to the nature and objects of the selections made, the
quantity and value of material used, and the degree in which the use may prejudice the
sale, diminish the profits, or supersede the objects of the original work . . . .”) (citations
omitted).
170. 389 F.2d 903, 905 (2d Cir. 1968).
171. Wepner & Ellis, supra note 164, at 167.
172. Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
Although the Supreme Court’s decision in eBay has left
some dispute as to the continuing validity of the presumption
of irreparable harm in copyright infringement cases, an indepth analysis demonstrates that removing the presumption
follows from the intent of the Supreme Court and allows for a
more equitable result. The serious nature of the injunction
calls for the four-factor test of equity to be used, requiring a
plaintiff to prove each factor. Spillane’s arguments proposing
the survival of the presumption in the wake of eBay and
Winter are flawed and lead to a less equitable result. It is
clear that courts will continue to require a plaintiff to satisfy
the four-factor test of equity before granting injunctive relief,
and there is no need for further clarification by the Supreme
Court.

